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Here We Are Now, Entertain Us:
Defining the Line Between
Personal and Professional
Context on Social Media
Raizel Liebler and Keidra Chaney*
Abstract
Social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and
Instagram allow individuals and companies to connect directly
and regularly with an audience of peers or with the public at
large. These websites combine the audience-building platforms
of mass media with the personal data and relationships of inperson social networks. Due to a combination of evolving user
activity and frequent updates to functionality and user features,
social media tools blur the line of whether a speaker is perceived
as speaking to a specific and presumed private audience, a
public expression of one’s own personal views, or a
representative viewpoint of an entire institution. However, the
intent of the speaker is frequently lost to the wide and diverse
breadth of social media audiences or obscured due to the
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workings of the specific social media platform being used.
In this article, we ask the question: should the job of
drawing the line between personal and professional speech lie
with the individual? Should the divide be clearly determined by
the functionality of the social media platform or by third party
processes and procedures such as organizational social media
policies or by state/federal law?
This issue of personal versus professional speech becomes
increasingly relevant not only to public figures such as
celebrities or athletes, but to anyone whose online or social
media presence is directly or indirectly connected to a larger
institution, such as a workplace or educational institution. As
social media platforms and online culture encourage
“transparency” and open sharing of personal details online, it is
not always easy to determine when personal versus professional
viewpoint is being represented via social media channels. When
an individual shares a controversial opinion outside of work, it
is not necessarily representative of their workplace, yet may be
perceived as such. When does an employer have the right to
monitor or dictate an individual’s online communications?
The line is difficult for everyone to walk – from the
perspective of both employers and employees, considering that
employees generally want to remain employed and employers
generally want to minimize anything negative reflecting back on
the employer. In this article, we discuss the tenuous balancing
act between the interests of a brand/employer with those of the
individual/employee regarding social media communications.
We illustrate this tension through the example of the
regulation of student-athletes within institutions of higher
education, considering they now might be considered to be
employees. However, we conclude that the challenges in
developing law and policy around social media speech are due
to a number of issues, including the rapid pace of development
of social media platforms. Social media gives greater access into
the lives of individuals due to emerging social norms that
encourage open sharing of personal information online. At the
same time, social media tools are used by companies to promote
a curated brand identity for marketing purposes. Social media
policies created both internally by employers and those
established by law and policymakers focus almost exclusively on

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/14

2

400

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 35:1

the interests of companies regarding social media, rather than
the individual interests of those who participate on social media
to connect with peers.
We conclude that the present approach that federal
financial regulators take regarding social media is the closest to
a well-balanced test as presently available – in this test, whether
an employer can take action against an employee is grounded
on whether a statement could be seen as directed by or an
official statement of the employer. A national standard
following this overall approach would best balance the interests
of both employers and employees.
I.

Introduction

Social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and
Instagram allow individuals and companies with a unique
online platform to connect directly, personally, and regularly
with an audience of peers or with the public at large. These
services combine the audience-building platforms of mass
media with the personal data and relationships of in-person
social networks.
Social media also creates new challenges and previously
unheard of issues for both individuals and companies,
including the gray area between personal statements intended
for peers and commentary geared toward the public at large.
Even before the advent of social media there have been
examples of how this gray area impacts both individuals and
business, most specifically when individuals post inappropriate
or personally damaging personal information online. This
information may range from evidence of crimes, confidential
professional information, threats, racist or sexist statements,
or ill-conceived statements of personal opinion.
There has been no shortage of examples of individuals
sharing inappropriate or crude statements with the public at
large. However, due to a combination of evolving user activity
and frequent updates to the functionality and user features of
social networking websites, these platforms often complicate
the issue of who the perceived audience is: a selected group of
peers, or the public.
On social media platforms, individuals often attempt to
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define a line between conversation intended for a specific,
limited audience, an outward expression of one’s own views, or
a representative viewpoint of an entire institution. However,
that line is not always easily recognized by a wide and diverse
breadth of social media audiences or shown by the social media
platform being used. In this article, we ask the question:
should the job of drawing the line between personal and
professional speech lie with the individual? Should it be clearly
determined by the functionality of the social media platform or
by third party processes and procedures such as organizational
social media policies or state/federal law?
This issue becomes increasingly relevant not only to public
figures such as celebrities or athletes, but to anyone whose
online or social media presence is directly or indirectly
connected to a larger institution (workplace, school, church,
etc.) As social media tools and culture encourage
“transparency” and open sharing of personal details online, it is
not always clear whose viewpoint is being represented via
social media. When an individual shares a controversial
opinion outside of work, it is not necessarily representative of
their workplace, yet may be perceived as such. When does an
employer have the right to monitor or dictate an individual’s
online communications?
The line is difficult for everyone to walk – from the
perspective of both employers and employees, considering that
employees generally want to remain employed and employers
generally want to minimize anything negative reflecting back
on the employer. In this article, we discuss below, the tenuous
balancing act between the interests of a brand/employer with
those of the individual/employee regarding social media
communications. We illustrate this through several examples,
most specifically focusing on the regulation of student-athletes
within institutions of higher education, considering they now
might be considered employees. However, we conclude that the
challenges in developing law and policy around social media
speech are due to a number of issues; the first being the rapid
pace of the development of social media platforms. Other issues
include the gray area that emerges from differing usage
patterns between individuals and companies. Social media
gives greater access into the lives of individuals due to
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emerging social norms that encourage open sharing of personal
information online. At the same time, social media tools are
used by companies to promote a curated brand identity for
marketing purposes.
Social media policies created both
internally by employers and those established by law and
policymakers focus almost exclusively on the interests of
companies with regard to social media, rather than the
individual interests of those who participate on social media to
connect with peers.
First, we explore the history of social media platforms and
the evolution of these private, closed networks into audiencedriven mass media tools. Then we give an overview of the
history of social media and its relationship to employment.
Next, we present an overview of the current law regarding
social media and employment. Finally, we conclude that the
approach that federal financial regulators take regarding social
media is the closest to a well-balanced test as presently in the
law – in this test, whether an employer can take action against
an employee is whether a statement could be seen as directed
by or is the official statement of the employer. A national
standard following this approach would best balance the
privacy interests of employees and “branding” interests of
employers.
II. From “Social Networking” to “Social Media”
Early social networking websites such as Friendster and
Myspace were intended to establish online networks among
like-minded peers and friends. At the same time there was
some debate within professional circles (primarily marketing,
advertising, and technology startups) about exactly what to call
this emerging online activity and the tools that make it
possible. Several names were in regular usage: “social media,”
“social networks,” and “social networking,” for example. In
2007, researchers danah boyd and Nicole Ellison attempted to
define the parameters of social networking websites with the
following description:
[Social networks are] web-based services that
allow individuals to (1) construct a public or
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semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2)
articulate a list of other users with whom they
share a connection, and (3) view and traverse
their list of connections and those made by others
within the system.1
While boyd’s and Ellison’s definition of these platforms was
an accurate reflection of this technology at the time, social
networking platforms quickly evolved into something quite
different than their initial description and usage. While
searchable and static personal profiles were a defining
characteristic of early social networking websites, in
subsequent years, social networks began to introduce
functionality that shifted the platform’s focus from
communicating with a select social network to a broad,
presumably public audience. Among this functionality includes
long-form status updates, publicly viewable content streams
organized by keywords through so-called “hashtags,” and paid
advertising functionalities, made available to both individuals
and companies. At the same time, individual users of these
platforms continue to use these websites as networks – a
service to connect with friends, and family, or to connect with
those of like-minded interests.
After 2007, social networking websites became more
formally established as audience-driven media services.
Facebook’s introduction of the “News Feed” functionality in
2006 made it possible for individuals (and businesses) within
Facebook to update content regularly that could be viewed in
real time by “friends” within the social network. In November
2007, Facebook rolled out specialized profiles for businesses
(called business pages) that were intended to allow companies
to market their services towards customers.2
On the other hand, Twitter’s evolution into a corporate
brand communication tool was not quite as intentional. Twitter
1. Nicole B. Ellison & danah m. boyd, Sociality Through Social Network
Sites, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNET STUDIES 151-72 (William H.
Dutton ed., 2013).
2. Howard Greenstein, Facebook Pages vs Facebook Groups: What's the
Difference?, MASHABLE (May 27, 2009),
http://mashable.com/2009/05/27/facebook-page-vs-group/.
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was originally conceived by co-founder Jack Dorsey as an SMS
service that allowed people to communicate with a small
group.3 While the original concept of Twitter was intended for
a limited audience, users quickly adapted the use of Twitter’s
functionality for more audience-centric communications. The
2007 South By Southwest Interactive Conference was another
milestone event toward the evolution from social networking to
social media, as the service was used as a public
communication tool; the company placed two 60-inch plasma
screens in conference hallways to show Twitter messages, and
the service was used by conference attendees to report on the
event in real time. During the conference, Twitter usage rose
from 20,000 tweets per day to 60,000.4
As more marketing and advertising professionals began to
use social media platforms to promote corporate brands,
individual users themselves began to use social media as a
platform for building a professional public identity, or
“personal brand.” While the concept of personal branding
certainly did not originate with social media platforms, social
media websites have become a common and popular tool for
individuals to create and maintain a professional persona or
demonstrate their area of expertise. Social network websites
are comprised of a broad public audience in which an
individual can develop a public persona through creating and
sharing original online content, or curating the content of
others.
Because of the importance of websites, social networks,
and other online tools for corporate branding and identity,
there is a history of tension between the use of these platforms
as a tool for personal expression compared to the use as
marketing/promotional tools for businesses and other
organizational entities.
The history of personal versus
professional identity online, and more specifically, the threat of
losing one’s job due to online communication, started well
before the advent of social media websites. One early and
3. Claire Cain Miller, Why Twitter's C.E.O. Demoted Himself, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 31, 2010, at BU1.
4. Nick Douglas, Twitter Blows Up at SXSW Conference, GAWKER (Mar.
12, 2007, 8:25 PM), http://gawker.com/243634/twitter-blows-up-at-sxswconference.
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notable example was web designer and blogger Heather
Armstrong, who kept a personal website called Dooce for 13
years. Armstrong was fired in 2002 by her startup employer
after writing satirical posts about her time there. Being
“dooced” later came to be used by online users and the media as
a euphemism for losing one’s job because of a blog or website.5
Because businesses want to protect their interests,
employers created policies regarding speech, especially policies
targeted toward non-polite or harassing speech, disparagement
of the company’s services or products, disclosure of sensitive
information (such as trade secrets), and criticism of workplace
management. Sometimes employer policy creation makes sense
in response to employees frequently using social media
platforms to publicly discuss their workplace, people at their
workplace, and their work itself. But policy creation by
employers is also part of a larger trend by employers to
increasingly control aspects of their employees’ lives, ranging
from compelled after-hours socializing to smoking restrictions.6
Therefore, social media’s widespread usage has led to a
number of cases of individuals being fired for statements made
online.7 But employers have also fired people based on actions,
5. Miles Klee, A Very Personal History of Getting Fired Over a Blog,
DAILY DOT (Mar. 10, 2014), http://www.dailydot.com/lifestyle/fired-for-myblog-dooced-personal-history/.
6. See Jessica L. Roberts, Healthism and the Law of Employment
Discrimination, 99 IOWA L. REV. 571, 571 (2014) (“Recently, several employers
around the country announced they would no longer hire applicants who use
nicotine, even off the clock”); Stephen D. Sugarman, "Lifestyle"
Discrimination in Employment, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 377, 381
(2003) (“[S]hould society intervene--and if so, when and through what legal
mechanisms--to preclude employers from making hiring, promotion,
discharge, discipline and other job decisions based on off-the-job conduct?”).
7. See Ryan Broderick and Emanuella Grinberg, 10 People Who Learned
Social
Media
Can
Get
You
Fired,
CNN
(June
6,
2013),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/06/living/buzzfeed-social-media-fired/;
See
Spectrum Workers Fired Over Facebook Picture, WZZM 13 (Aug. 29, 2013),
http://www.wzzm13.com/story/news/local/metro/2014/02/05/1609120/ (writing
that multiple hospital workers were fired when a photograph of the backside
of an unknown women was posted on Facebook with the caption, “I like what
I like”); See David Kaplan, Francesca’s CFO Fired Over Use of Social Media,
HOUSTON
CHRONICLE
(May
14,
2012),
http://www.chron.com/business/article/Francesca-s-CFO-fired-over-use-ofsocial-media-3558203.php (noting that the CFO Gene Morphis was fired for
improperly communicating information about the company through social
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rather than speech. Social media can draw publicity to
conflicting viewpoints between employers and employees, when
employees are fired for legal activities outside of work of which
the employer does not approve. Some examples include the
seemingly never-ending stream of teachers who are fired for
previous work in the sex industry8 or marrying a same-sex
partner.9 However, encouraging social media use can benefit
companies because of increased company exposure through
employees’ posts, tweets, or other social media use.
III. Overview of the Law’s Relationship to Employers,
Employees, and Social Media
With both technology and user behavior blurring the lines
of acceptable and accepted social media use by individuals and
companies, the law plays a confusing role in providing clarity.
Some experts view the legal efforts to help solve the social
media and employment conundrum as trying to reinterpret a
media.
8. See Eric Owens, Teacher Fired Just Because She Was a Stripper Gets
$45,000
Settlement,
THE
DAILY
CALLER
(June
26,
2013),
http://dailycaller.com/2013/06/26/teacher-fired-just-because-she-was-astripper-gets-45000-settlement/; Lee Moran, Spanish High School Teacher
Who Posed Naked for Playboy Is Fired, NY DAILY NEWS (Oct. 16, 2013),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/spanish-teacher-posed-nakedplayboy-fired-article-1.1487060; see also Tony Aiello, Ex-Stripper-TurnedTeacher
Petro
Moves
On,
CBS
N.Y.
(Feb.
10,
2011),
http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2011/02/10/former-stripper-turned-teacher-ismoving-on-with-life/ (reporting that former Bronx elementary school art
teacher was suspended for her previous work as an exotic dancer).
9. See Carol Kuruvilla, Fired Gay Vice Principal Fighting Back Against
Seattle-area Catholic School, NY DAILY NEWS (Mar. 8, 2014),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/ousted-gay-vice-principalfighting-back-catholic-school-fired-article-1.1715326
(stating
that
the
Catholic school gave an employee an ultimatum, either divorce his husband
or be fired); Fired Gay Glendora Catholic Schoolteacher Sues St. Lucy’s
Priory,
SAN
GABRIEL
VALLEY
TRIB.
(Mar.
13,
2014),
http://www.sgvtribune.com/social-affairs/20140313/fired-gay-glendoracatholic-schoolteacher-sues-st-lucys-priory (reporting that a former Catholic
teacher thinks he was fired after marrying his partner after same-sex
marriage became legal in California); Clare Kim, Gay Teacher Fired After
Applying
for
Marriage
License,
MSNBC
(Dec.
9,
2013),
http://www.msnbc.com/the-last-word/gay-teacher-fired-marriage-license
(stating that a foreign language Catholic teacher was fired after he applied
for a marriage license to wed his partner of 12 years).
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continuum into a simple binary. Eric Goldman argues that
the law assumes that social media accounts have
only two states: personal or not-personal.
Instead, social media accounts fit along a
continuum where the endpoints are (1)
completely personal, and (2) completely businessrelated–but many employees’ social media
accounts (narrowly construed, ignoring the
statutory overbreadth problem) fit somewhere in
between those two endpoints. Indeed, employers
and employees routinely disagree about whether
or not a social media account was personal or
business-related.10
However, attempting to use the creation date of a social
media account as a dividing line between personal and
professional use does not help. The usability functionality on
several social media platforms such as Facebook, requires a
business page to be tied to a personal account. If an employee is
directed to create or use a social media account for their job, it
is very likely to be tied to their personal social media account.
Law and policymakers have come no closer to finding a
clear solution to the issue. In a statement announcing the
failed federal Social Networking Online Protection Act bill,
Representative Eliot L. Engel said:
The lack of clarity in the law puts individuals in
a position where they either have to give up
vital, private information, or risk losing their job,
potential job, or enrollment in school and
involvement in the school’s sports programs.
Frankly, when there are no laws prohibiting
institutions from requiring this information, it
becomes a common practice. Social media sites
10. Eric Goldman, Big Problems in California's New Law Restricting
Employers' Access to Employees' Online Accounts, FORBES (Sept. 28, 2012,
12:39 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2012/09/28/big-problemsin-californias-new-law-restricting-employers-access-to-employees-onlineaccounts/.
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have become a widespread communications tool –
both personally and professionally – all across
the world. It is erroneous to just say that if you
don’t want your information accessed that you
shouldn’t put it online.11
While social media and online monitoring of individuals by
federal or state government has, and should, be analyzed
through a Fourth Amendment lens, our concern is not
specifically with government or non-government intrusion into
social media use by employees, but instead with the
individual’s right to a private life and to represent themselves
and their views publicly and independently outside of the
workplace, regardless of employer. The following examples help
to illustrate previous attempts to define the role of the law in
determining the rights and responsibilities of an individual’s
communication and self-expression via social media.
A. United States Supreme Court
In a 2010 case, City of Ontario v. Quon, the U.S. Supreme
Court attempted to determine the privacy expectations of an
employee. SWAT Officer Quon claimed that when his employer
searched the personal text messages he sent from his
employer-provided pager, it was a violation of his privacy.
The Court did not want to make a premature legal rule
regarding privacy and technology in the workplace, considering
“[a]t present, it is uncertain how workplace norms, and the
law’s treatment of them, will evolve” regarding the interaction
between these elements.12 Technology and norms are not
static; instead “rapid changes in the dynamics of
communication and information transmission are evident not
just in the technology itself but in what society accepts as
proper behavior.”13 The Court admitted having “difficulty
11. Press Release, Eliot L. Engel, Reps. Engel, Schakowsky, Grimm Seek
to
Protect
Online
Content
(Feb.
6,
2013),
available
at
http://engel.house.gov/common/popup/popup.cfm?action=item.print&itemID=
3352.
12. City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 759 (2010).
13. Id.
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predicting how employees’ privacy expectations will be shaped
by those changes or the degree to which society will be
prepared to recognize those expectations as reasonable.”14
However, the Court stated that “employer policies concerning
communications will of course shape the reasonable [privacy]
expectations of their employees, especially to the extent that
such policies are clearly communicated.”15
Some commenters thought this case had larger policy
implications, arguing that “the equalization of privacy rights in
the public and private sector down to the [lower] level
[provided to] the private sector is mistaken.”16 On the other
hand, Eric Goldman stated that he did not “see how this case’s
outcome has any implications for private-sector employees or
employers.”17 We leave to others to determine whether Quon
has direct implications for private sector employees, but there
are other federal-level limitations on employer restrictions on
employee use of social media.
B. Federal Law
Several government agencies have attempted to define the
line between speech that represents an entire entity and
speech that only represents that of individuals. The regulations
range greatly in their scope – from the Federal Trade
Commission’s (FTC) concern about transparency in
advertising, to the National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB)
concern about limits on union organizing by employers, to the
Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) concern about
business communications regarding regulated industries.
1. Federal Trade Commission
The Federal Trade Commission has attempted to define
14. Id. at 759-60.
15. Id. at 760.
16. Paul M. Secunda, Privatizing Workplace Privacy, 88 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 277, 281 (2012).
17. Ethan Ackerman, No Wrath in This Quon-Ontario v. Quon, TECH. &
MARKETING.
L.
BLOG
(June
20,
2010),
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2010/06/no_wrath_in_thi.htm.
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the differentiation between an individual speaking
independently or speaking on behalf of a corporate entity. The
Federal Trade Commission revised rules for Internet reviews in
the FTC’s Guide Concerning the Use of Endorsements and
Testimonials in Advertising (“the Guides”). The Guides are
administrative interpretations of the law intended to help
compliance with the Federal Trade Commission Act, but are
not binding law themselves.
The purpose of the Guides is to protect consumers by
creating a line between paid and consumer endorsements.18
When the FTC analyzes statements made via social media:
The fundamental question is whether, viewed
objectively, the relationship between the
advertiser and the speaker is such that the
speaker’s
statement
can
be
considered
“sponsored” by the advertiser and therefore an
“advertising message.” In other words, in
disseminating positive statements about a
product or service, is the speaker: (1) acting
solely independently, in which case there is no
endorsement, or (2) acting on behalf of the
advertiser or its agent, such that the speaker’s
statement is an “endorsement” that is part of an
overall marketing campaign?19
Therefore, to have a lawful social media policy under the
FTC mandate, employees must disclose any connection to their
employers, plus use a clear and conspicuous disclaimer. An
employer’s social media policy must explain how to adhere to
the FTC’s new standards if an employee is using social media
to endorse an employer’s products or services.20
However, the FTC also thinks that the possibility of an
employee “going rogue” is not a concern, as indicated in the
Guide:
18. Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in
Advertising, 74 Fed. Reg. 53,124, 53,124 (Oct. 15, 2009) (codified at 16 C.F.R.
§ 255).
19. Id. at 53,126.
20. 16 C.F.R. § 255.5 (2009).
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although the Commission has brought law
enforcement actions against companies whose
failure to establish or maintain appropriate
internal procedures resulted in consumer injury,
it is not aware of any instance in which an
enforcement action was brought against a
company for the actions of a single “rogue”
employee who violated established company
policy that adequately covered the conduct in
question.21
Therefore, according to the FTC, if an employer has a
known policy by employees, the possibility of an employee’s
actions on social media being used against the company in an
action by the FTC is minimal.
2. National Labor Relations Board
Thoroughly discussing NLRB and its goal to prevent
employers from limiting union organizing may seem like a step
backwards; the NLRB’s role is structured through an
industrial-era framework of workers’ rights and away from our
present online era where unions are less relevant to the
general population than they were in the 20th century.
However, along with state laws limiting employer intrusion by
requesting social media passwords, this federal government
agency takes one of the most employee-protective approaches
regarding separating personal (including union organizing)
from the professional. Also, unlike the SEC (discussed infra),
the NLRB’s charge effects the majority of American employees.
Employees have increasingly been turning to social media
platforms to publicly discuss their workplace, people at their
workplace, and their work itself. For many, social media is
added to earlier ways to engage in discussions about the
workplace, like talking to others in person or on the phone.
Social media interactions have been added to employer speech
21. Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in
Advertising, 74 Fed. Reg. at 53136.
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limiting policies that attempt to regulate what employees say,
especially non-polite or harassing speech, disparagement of the
company’s services or products, disclosure of sensitive
information (such as trade secrets), and criticism of workplace
management. By enforcing these speech and social media
policies against employees, some of these disciplinary actions
made their way to the NLRB.
But the NLRB restrictions as discussed below are still
difficult for both employers and employees to decipher. The
NLRB’s scope is focused not on what would be in the best
interest of employees, but rather to ensure that the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which gives employees the right
to “engage in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or mutual aid or protection” is not
violated.22
This article is not offering a critique of the NLRB, which is
staying within the bounds of its administrative authority.
Many other scholars do have critiques of the NLRB’s recent
actions regarding social media policies.23 We are, however, of
the opinion that law and policy makers have a narrow
understanding of the range and scope of social media activities
by Americans at work and at home. But because the NLRB’s
focus is on unionizing rather than the overall limitations of
speech and behavior, it cannot improve social media policies for
employees in a more global sense.
The Office of the General Counsel for the NLRB has issued
several reports of investigations involving both the use of social
media and employers’ social and general media policies. After
an increasing number of NLRB cases related to social media
emerged, the NLRB’s Acting General Counsel issued three
reports during 2011 and 2012 outlining the NLRA’s application

22. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2012).
23. See Alexandra Hemenway, The NLRB and Social Media: Does the
NLRB "Like" Employee Interests?, 38 J. CORP. L. 607 (2013); Christine Neylon
O'Brien, The Top Ten NLRB Cases on Facebook Firings and Employer Social
Media Policies, 92 OR. L. REV. 337 (2013); Robert Sprague & Abigail E.
Fournier, Online Social Media and the End of the Employment-at-Will
Doctrine, 52 WASHBURN L.J. 557 (2013); Rebecca Stang, I Get by with a Little
Help from My "Friends": How the National Labor Relations Board
Misunderstands Social Media, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 621 (2013).
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to employee social media postings and employers’ policies.24
Read together, the reports mean that employer social
media policies should not be so broad as to limit protected
activities, such as discussing wages or working conditions
among employees. Generally, the more vague and expansive
an employer’s social media policy’s prohibitions regarding
employee speech, the more likely they will be considered to be
unlawfully overbroad. However, if the comments by employees
are personal gripes disconnected from group activity among
employees they are generally not protected. In simpler terms,
the closer the action is to workplace organizing, the greater
likelihood that firing the employee would violate the Labor
Relations Act. But if the action is closer to simple griping, the
greater the possibility that disciplinary action would be legal.
On January 24, 2012, the Acting General Counsel issued a
second report, clarifying the NLRB’s critique of general nonspecific policies, expanding the types of policy terms that are
disliked because they had an impermissible effect, whether or
not they were actually enforced, of chilling employees’ exercise
rights.
Policy terms that are disfavored include those
prohibiting
disparaging
or
inappropriate
comments,
disrespectful conduct, or the disclosure of sensitive or
confidential matters.25
However, the report also included inconsistencies in
establishing policy. For example, a policy that instead of
24. LAFE SOLOMON, ACTING GEN. COUNSEL, N.L.R.B. TO ALL REGIONAL
DIRECTORS, OFFICERS-IN-CHARGE, AND RESIDENT OFFICERS, REPORT OF THE
ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES, N.L.R.B. (2012),
available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d4580a375cd;
LAFE SOLOMON, ACTING GEN. COUNSEL, N.L.R.B. TO ALL REGIONAL DIRECTORS,
OFFICERS-IN-CHARGE, AND RESIDENT OFFICERS, REPORT OF THE ACTING
GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES, N.L.R.B. (2012),
available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45807d6567;
LAFE SOLOMON, ACTING GEN. COUNSEL, N.L.R.B. TO ALL REGIONAL DIRECTORS,
OFFICERS-IN-CHARGE, AND RESIDENT OFFICERS, REPORT OF THE ACTING
GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES, N.L.R.B. (2011),
available at http://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/acting-generalcounsel-releases-report-social-media-cases.
25. LAFE E. SOLOMON, ACTING GEN. COUNSEL, ACTING GEN. COUNSEL,
N.L.R.B. TO ALL REGIONAL DIRECTORS, OFFICERS-IN-CHARGE, AND RESIDENT
OFFICERS, REPORT OF THE ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL
MEDIA CASES, N.L.R.B. (2012), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/news/actinggeneral-counsel-issues-second-social-media-report.
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prohibiting unfriendly language prohibits vulgar, obscene,
threatening, or intimidating language and actions is
acceptable, because prohibitions are sufficiently detailed. An
overall restriction on disclosing personal or sensitive
information, which could encompass working conditions, is not
permitted. However, a policy requiring employees to follow
securities regulations and other laws that prohibit disclosing
confidential or proprietary information is permissible.26
Following the issuance of the first two reports in March
2012, the Acting General Counsel stated that a specific
company’s policy’s rule against disclosure of “confidential, nonpublic information” was “so vague” that “without limiting
language,” employees could view it as preventing them from
engaging in legally protected activities. The Acting General
Counsel found, in one case, that even though Giant Foods had
an interest in strongly protecting its trademarks, it could not
forbid employees’ noncommercial use of the trademarks while
engaging in NLRA related activities. However, the policy’s
requirement that employees “not defame” or “otherwise
discredit” the company’s products or services, and that
employees report others for violating the policy, was held to be
lawful.27
On May 30, 2012, the Acting General Counsel released its
third report, focusing on employer policies, including approving
policies that prohibit the disclosure of attorney-client privileged
information and also require employees to respect copyright
and other intellectual property laws. The report examined
employer policies, finding that Wal-Mart’s social media policy
prohibiting “inappropriate postings that may include
discriminatory remarks, harassment and threats of violence or
similar inappropriate or unlawful conduct” was acceptable.28
However, General Motors’ policy with similar wording was not
26. Id.
27. Advice Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, Associate General
Counsel, N.L.R.B., Office of the General Counsel, to Wane Gold, Regional
Director (March 21, 2012), available at http://op.bna.com/tpif.nsf/id/mlon99ykxz/$File/Giant%20Food.pdf.
28. LAFE E. SOLOMON, ACTING GEN. COUNSEL, N.L.R.B. TO ALL REGIONAL
DIRECTORS, OFFICERS-IN-CHARGE, AND RESIDENT OFFICERS, REPORT OF THE
ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA, N.L.R.B. 20 (2012)
available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d4580a375cd.
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acceptable: “We found unlawful the instruction that ‘offensive,
demeaning, abusive or inappropriate remarks are as out of
place online as they are offline.”29 This “provision proscribes a
broad spectrum of communications that would include
protected criticisms of the employer’s labor policies or
treatment of employees.”30
Within the May 2012 report, the NLRB found acceptable
language in a policy stating that employees may not represent
“any opinion or statement as the policy or view of the
[Employer] or of any individual in their capacity as an
employee or otherwise on behalf of the [Employer].”31 The
policy language was viewed as acceptable because it referred to
comments made from the perspective of the employer – not the
employee. Also found acceptable was policy language stating:
“postings are ‘my own and do not represent [Employer’s]
positions, strategies or opinions’ . . . . An employer has a
legitimate need for a disclaimer to protect itself from
unauthorized postings made to promote its product or
services.”32
3. Other Federal Agencies: Financial Institutions and
Social Media
However, one of the more interesting elements regarding
social media communications in this area is actually not
directly about employees, but about helping to create a good
dividing line between personal and professional in other
contexts.
The federal agencies that deal with financial
institutions have the charge to make sure that those that work
in these regulated industries behave appropriately regarding
disclosing information that may impact investors.
The
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) require brokerdealers and registered investment advisers to monitor
employees’ use of social media, to ensure that employees do not

29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 8.
Id.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 17.
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harm investors through their use of social media. Therefore,
“[f]irms must adopt policies and procedures reasonably
designed to ensure that their associated persons who
participate in social media sites for business purposes are
appropriately supervised . . . and do not present undue risks to
investors.”33
According to FINRA, the determination of what constitutes
a business communication is solely based on its content.34 The
determination regarding whether the communication relates to
“business as such” does not depend on whether the
communication was made on a personal or business account
meaning that if someone is on their personal Facebook,
Twitter, or other social media account they still need to be
cautious about talking about work.35 The SEC also uses a
content-based determination process,36 aware that social media
has “landscape-shifting” possibilities; the SEC suggests
“adopt[ing], and periodically review[ing] the effectiveness of,
policies and procedures regarding social media in the face of
rapidly changing technology.”37
The combination of the present federal regulations and
state laws causes issues for those in these regulated industries
and some have suggested that the
optimal resolution would be the creation of a
33. FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 10-06, SOCIAL MEDIA WEB SITES,
GUIDANCE ON BLOGS AND SOCIAL NETWORKING WEBSITES 7 (2010), available at
https://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notic
es/p120779.
34. FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 11-39, SOCIAL MEDIA WEBSITES AND THE
USE OF PERSONAL DEVICES FOR BUSINESS COMMUNICATIONS, GUIDANCE ON
SOCIAL NETWORKING WEBSITES AND BUSINESS COMMUNICATIONS 2-3 (2011),
available
at
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notice
s/p124186.
35. Id. at 3.
36. SEC Div. of Inv. Mgmt., IM Guidance Update, Filing Requirements
for
Certain
Electronic
Communications
(2013),
available
at
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/guidance/im-guidance-updatefiling-requirements-for-certain-electronic-communications.pdf.
37. SEC Off. of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, National
Examination Risk Alert, Investment Adviser Use of Social Media 1-2 (Jan. 4,
2012),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/riskalertsocialmedia.pdf.
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single federal regime that defers to FINRA, the
SEC and other financial regulatory authorities
wherever conflicts exist. Such a regime could be
accomplished through a federal social media
privacy statute with clear language exempting
the monitoring of personal social media accounts
if companies are required to do so under
applicable law, and pre-empting any conflicting
laws, including the NLRA and state laws.38
Creating a simplified regulatory regime where the default
is privacy for social media accounts would help protect the
interests of employees. Also, this default would better prompt
the public to see statements from individuals on social media
as reflecting only their own views rather than automatically as
statements reflecting viewpoints of an employer.
C. State Laws Related to Social Media Access by Employers or
Educational Institutions
Many states have enacted legislation this term regarding
protecting social media accounts from prying eyes, whether
from employers or educational institutions. However, some
experts believe that all of the statutory solutions discussed do
not address the proper issue involving intrusiveness into
privacy. In a post entitled “The Spectacular Failure of
Employee Social Media Privacy Laws,” Eric Goldman states
that
a decent policy objective–prevent[ing] employers
from inappropriately demanding employees’
social media passwords–can be hard to convert
into rigorous legislative drafting, especially in
technology contexts. To me, the lesson is that if
rigorous legislative drafting isn’t likely, maybe

38. Richard J. Rabin et al., CATCH-22.COM: Conflicting Social Media
Regulatory Regimes and the Impact on Financial Institutions, 03 SOC. MEDIA
L.
&
POL’Y
REP.
(BNA)
9
(Mar.
2014),
available
at
http://cdn.akingump.com/images/content/2/7/v2/27578/Catch-22-Article.pdf.
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the policy objective isn’t worth pursuing in the
first place.39
Most states have at least some legislation addressing social
media and employees or higher education institutions (see
Appendix infra). On August 1, 2012, Illinois Governor Pat
Quinn signed H.B. 3782 (Public Act 097-0875), effective on
January 1, 2013.40 The new law amended the Right to Privacy
in the Workplace Act,41 providing that it shall be unlawful for
employers to ask prospective employees information related to
their social networking websites in order to gain access to such
accounts or profiles.42 This prohibition does not affect the
usage or monitor the usage of the employers’ electronic
equipment, nor affect employees’ information that can be
obtained under other laws, such as information that is in the
public domain.43
Similarly, on September 27, 2012, California enacted social
media privacy laws affecting employers and postsecondary
educational institutions.44 One law prohibits employers from
requiring or requesting social media related information from
their employees or potential employees.45 It also prohibits
employers from retaliating against an employee or applicant
for not complying with a request or demand by a violating
employer.46 The other California law prohibits employees and
39. Eric Goldman, The Spectacular Failure of Employee Social Media
Privacy Laws, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (May 31, 2014).
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2014/05/state_laws_to_p.htm.
40. H.B. 3782, 97th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2012).
41. ILL. PUB. ACT. 097-0875 (2012); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 55/10 (2013).
42. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 55/10(b)(1) (provides that it shall be unlawful
for any employer to ask any prospective employee to provide any username,
password, or other related account information in order to gain access to a
social networking website where that prospective employee maintains an
account or profile); see also Ill. H.B. 3782.
43. 820 ILL COMP. STAT. 55/10(b)(2-3).
44. CAL. LAB. CODE § 980 (West 2014); CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 99120-99122
(West 2014).
45. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 980(b); see also id. § 980(c)-(d) (these specify
that section 980 does not affect “employer’s existing rights and obligations to
request an employee to divulge personal social media reasonably believe to be
relevant to an investigation of allegations of employee misconduct or violation
[of laws]” or “accessing an employer-issued electronic device”).
46. Id. § 980(e).
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representatives of public and private postsecondary
educational institutions from requiring social media disclosure
from their students, prospective students, or student groups.47
It also requires that institutions ensure compliance with these
provisions and post the social media privacy policy on their web
site.48
IV. Contracts: Employment Contracts and Sponsorship Deals
The issue of employers and educational institutions asking
for access to social media passwords is slowly being addressed
by state legislatures.
However, there are still several
important trends within case law related to the interaction of
social media and employment. One thread of this trend relates
to the confusion that exists when an individual is the sole
representative or social media “voice” to promote the services
or work of an employer, or when an individual willingly shares
personal social media profile information to an employer.
Another thread relates to whose “voice” is speaking – whether
it is that of the individual employee or of the employer as a
whole.
A. Employment Cases
The cases we discuss below address varied litigated issues
between employers and employees regarding social media
accounts. Two cases, PhoneDog v. Kravitz,49 discussed infra,
and Eagle v. Morgan,50 have been previously analyzed in law
47. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 99121(a)-(b); see also id. § 99121(c) (provides
exceptions similar to the ones provided in CAL. LAB. CODE § 980(c)).
48. Id. § 99121.
49. PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C 11–03474 MEJ, 2012 WL 273323 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 30, 2012).
50. Eagle v. Morgan, No. 11–4303, 2011 WL 6739448 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22,
2011). In this case, it is not an employee who is accused of misusing the
social media account of the employer, but rather the employer who is accused
of incorrectly using the social media account of a former employee. Eagle v.
Morgan, No. C 11–4303, 2012 WL 4739436 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2012) (citing
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Response to Interrogatories
No. 2). LinkedIn is generally viewed as a platform that bridges the divide
between personal and professional information. It is intended for individuals
to connect professionally with others, but also requires people to mention
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review articles, either discussing the issues generally51 or
specifically regarding trade secret issues.52 Additionally, there
their present and former positions and employers. Eagle created her
LinkedIn account while at the employer, but the information in the profile
was information about herself rather than specifically about work for her
employer. Eagle was locked out of her LinkedIn page for two weeks by her
former employer, possibly because during her time of employment she had
provided her LinkedIn password to other employees that were assisting her
with using the account. Id. (citing Plaintiff’s Complaint). After her
termination, continuing employees with access to her account, continued to
use the account and also locked her out of it, by changing the password. Id.
(citing Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Response to
Interrogations No. 2). The employer, Educomm, saw Eagle’s page as a
corporate asset, rather than as a personal page, changing the password, and
scooping out Eagle’s information and swapping in information about another
employee. Eagle v. Morgan, No. C 11–4303, 2013 WL 943350, at *3 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 12, 2013); see Linda Eagle LinkedIn Page, LINKEDIN,
linkedin.com/in/lindaeagle (last visited Dec. 22, 2014). This meant that those
looking for Linda Eagle on LinkedIn would only find the Morgan information
Eagle page. Id. Eagle argued that the LinkedIn page was a corporate asset
rather than a personal page, despite the terms of service for LinkedIn, which
limit sharing of passwords with others. User Agreement, LINKEDIN (Mar. 26,
2014), http://www.linkedin.com/legal/user-agreement. In the end, despite the
court finding that Eagle proved several of her claims, including unauthorized
use of name, invasion of privacy/misappropriation of identity and
misappropriation of publicity, she lost because she encountered no economic
damages.
51. See Kyle-Beth Hilfer, Minimizing Legal Risks for Clients Using
Social Media to Advertise and Market Their Brands, 38 WESTCHESTER B.J. 35
(2012); Robert J. Kolansky, Can We Really Ascribe a Dollar Amount to
Interpersonal Communication? How Phonedog v. Kravitz May Decide Who
Owns A Twitter Account, 20 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 133 (2013);
Agnieszka A. Mcpeak, The Facebook Digital Footprint: Paving Fair and
Consistent Pathways to Civil Discovery of Social Media Data, 48 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 887 (2013); Adam S. Nelson, Tweet Me Fairly: Finding
Attribution Rights Through Fair Use in the Twittersphere, 22 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 697 (2012); Bethany N. Whitfield, Social
Media @ Work: #Policyneeded, 66 ARK. L. REV. 843 (2013).
52. See David S. Almeling, Seven Reasons Why Trade Secrets Are
Increasingly Important, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1091 (2012); Zoe Argento,
Whose Social Network Account? A Trade Secret Approach to Allocating
Rights, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 201 (2013); Francois Quintin
Cilliers, The Role and Effect of Social Media in the Workplace, 40 N. KY. L.
REV. 567 (2013); Hope A. Comisky & Tracey E. Diamond, The Risks and
Rewards of a Byod Program: Ensuring Corporate Compliance Without
Causing “Bring Your Own Disaster” at Work, 8 CHARLESTON L. REV. 385
(2014); Stephen McJohn, Top Tens in 2011: Copyright and Trade Secret
Cases, 10 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 331 (2012); Tiffany A. Miao, Access
Denied: How Social Media Accounts Fall Outside the Scope of Intellectual
Property Law and Into the Realm of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 23
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are several other litigated cases, such as Artis Health, LLC v.
Nankivell, that are not discussed in this article.53
The
following cases are not clear-cut about the line between an
employer’s social media presence and the employee’s social
media presence, due to both technological issues and user
activity.
1. PhoneDog v. Kravitz
In PhoneDog v. Kravitz, a person working as the social
media “voice” of a company claimed ownership over a social
media account used by him, and only him, as the user.54 In
April 2006, Noah Kravitz started working at PhoneDog.com, a
news and review site, where his job duties required him to
regularly serve as the social media presence of the company,
tweeting using the Twitter name @PhoneDogNoah.55 During
Kravitz’s employment with PhoneDog, the @PhoneDogNoah
amassed almost 17,000 Twitter followers.56 He became a
contributor to CNBC and Fox shows, where his employer was
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1017 (2013).
53. While not the only issue at dispute between the parties, the part of
the case related to employment and social media relates to an employee
leaving without giving back passwords, but due to the written agreement
regarding ownership of the accounts, the former employee lost. Artis Health,
LLC v. Nankivell, No. 11 Civ. 5013, 2012 WL 5290326, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y Oct.
23, 2012). Nenkivell worked for Curb Your Cravings, LLC (“CYC”) as a
“video and social media producer,” where her work included producing videos,
websites, blogs, and social media pages for CYC and the other two plaintiffs.
Her responsibilities included maintaining passwords and other login
information for websites, email accounts, and social media accounts.” Id. at
*1. In response to a claim for injunctive relief, the court states that because
Nenkivell retained passwords, the plaintiffs have a claim of conversion that
can move forward, and that plaintiffs’ inability to access and update their site
constitutes irreparable harm. Id. at *3. This case differs from the other
cases discussed because there is an agreement between the parties regarding
ownership of the accounts – but also that the accounts do not appear to be
taken over by the former employee, instead she was just holding on to the
passwords. In this case, the voice of the social media accounts was intended
by all parties to be of the employer, so it makes sense that the former
employee would not be allowed to hold on to the social media presence built
while employed.
54. PhoneDog v. Kravitz, No. C 11–03474 MEJ, 2011 WL 5415612 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 8, 2011).
55. Id. at *1.
56. Id.
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listed as Phonedog.57 In October 2010, Kravitz’s employment
with PhoneDog ended; PhoneDog requested that Kravitz turn
control of the Twitter account over to the company.58 Based on
these facts, it seems like PhoneDog did not have any
alternative users of the account, a situation that is not usual
for present day corporate Twitter accounts, but was more
common four years ago.
Kravitz had changed the Twitter handle to reflect his own
name – @noahkravitz and continued to post regularly,
promoting the products of his new employer.59 He claimed that
the Twitter name change removing PhoneDog from “his”
Twitter name was with their knowledge; it claimed otherwise. 60
PhoneDog sued Kravitz for misappropriation of trade secrets,
intentional interference with prospective economic advantage,
negligent interference with prospective economic advantage,
and conversion.61
The court’s initial order dismissed
PhoneDog’s claims for negligent and intentional interference
with economic relationships, but did not dismiss PhoneDog’s
claims for conversion and misappropriation of trade secrets.62
In its amended complaint, PhoneDog claimed that it had
an economic relationship with the followers of Kravitz’s Twitter
account, so Kravitz taking over the account disrupted the
“relationship.”63 Also, PhoneDog argued that by continuing to
appear on CNBC and Fox News while not being employed by
them, Kravitz interfered with its economic relationship with
these channels.64 The economic relationship that PhoneDog
had with the Twitter followers of the account was created
through Kravitz’s actions.
57. Counterclaims and Answer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, ¶
24, PhoneDog v. Kravitz (No. 11-cv-0347), 2011 WL 5415612 (N.D. Cal. Nov.
8, 2011).
58. PhoneDog, 2011 WL 5415612, at *1.
59. Counterclaims and Answer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, ¶
22, PhoneDog v. Kravitz (No. 11-cv-0347), 2011 WL 5415612 (N.D. Cal. Nov.
8, 2011).
60. Id. at ¶ 20.
61. PhoneDog, 2011 WL 5415612, at *1.
62. Id.
63. First Amended Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief, ¶ 3536, PhoneDog v. Kravitz (No. 11-cv-0347), 2011 WL 5415612 (N.D. Cal. Nov.
8, 2011).
64. Id.
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In the initial order, the court stated that PhoneDog
successfully pleaded negligence by alleging “Kravitz owed a
duty of care to PhoneDog as an agent of PhoneDog.”65 The
court did not address the issue of how long after employment
ends does the duty as an agent continue. After a year and a
half after filing, the case settled.66
In this case, Kravitz did create the Twitter account while
working for PhoneDog and most of the tweets were about
PhoneDog. While PhoneDog claims that the Twitter followers
were as a result of relationship building, what is not
acknowledged is that Kravitz was the singular catalyst for
those relationships in the first place. Additionally, the use of
Kravitz name within PhoneDog’s Twitter name implies that
those who follow the feed could potentially be interested in
either content about PhoneDog or the content specifically
created by Kravitz. That is to say, there is the possibility that
Kravitz, rather than PhoneDog, may have been the primary
draw for followers. This possibility is not acknowledged.
Kravitz’s identity, including his persona and his image,
was part of his work for PhoneDog, and the argument
PhoneDog made regarding how their former spokesperson
should not be allowed to participate on traditional media, such
as Fox News, would be considered by almost anyone as a
laughable one in other industries. After all, television pundits
and commentators change their employment status frequently
without it compromising the reputation of former employers.
PhoneDog’s argument regarding the Twitter account is
analogous, considering that the account was in the “voice” of
Kravitz.
In this case, most of the Tweets on the account were about
technology rather than personal interactions with friends and
family. However, the interactivity of Twitter does not separate
the range of communications between professional and
personal easily. But what if the account preceded employment
by the company and then he wanted to leave with the account?
Considering how social media accounts are actually used, the
65. PhoneDog, 2012 WL 273323, at *1 (citing Plaintiff’s First Amended
Complaint).
66. PhoneDog, LLC, v. Kravitz, No. 3:11-cv-03474-MEJ, 2013 WL
207773 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2013).
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threads between personal and professional can became
impossibly tangled, even if the stated purpose of the account is
personal – not professional.
2. Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Group, Ltd.
In Maremont, the employer used an employee’s personally
identified social media account for marketing purposes,
speaking as the “voice” of the employee. In this case, we see the
difficulty in drawing a clear line between employer and
employee social media communications when technical
functionality does not make such a distinction easy to execute.
Maremont worked as an interior designer working for Susan
Fredman Design Group (SFDG) as SFDG’s Director of
Marketing, Public Relations, and e-commerce.67 Maremont had
a personal Twitter (@jmaremont) and Facebook accounts that
were nevertheless tied to her career and work,68 where there
did not appear to be a clear delineation between the two.
Maremont also created a SFDG sub-blog “Designer Diaries:
Tales from the Interior” hosted on SFDG’s main blog.69
Maremont’s image appeared on each blogpost and tweet
authored by her.70
As the court discusses, the difficulty in determining what
was personal and what was related to her job is also based on
the technological means of using social media:
Maremont created a Facebook page for SFDG at
Fredman’s request. Maremont opened SFDG’s
Facebook page through her personal Facebook
account on February 17, 2009. In order to
administer SFDG’s page, the page administrator
had to log on through his or her personal
Facebook account.71
67. Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Grp., Ltd., 772 F. Supp. 2d 967,
969 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
68. Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Grp., Ltd., No. 10 C 7811, 2014
WL 812401, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2014).
69. Maremont, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 969.
70. Id.
71. Maremont, 2014 WL 812401, at *2.
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Access to Maremont-named account passwords
became an issue between the parties:
To keep track of the various social media
campaigns she was conducting for SFDG,
Maremont created an electronic spreadsheet in
which she stored all account access information,
including the passwords for her Twitter and
Facebook accounts. . . . Laurice Shelven, an
intern at SFDG from September 8, 2009 to
December 30, 2009, states that Maremont
provided her with the spreadsheet so she could
assist Maremont in composing and publishing
posts for the various SFDG social media
campaigns.72
In September 2009, Maremont was severely injured and
was in the hospital for an extended stay.73 While Maremont
was at the hospital, SFDG continued to access and post from
the personal accounts of Maremont.74 All of the posts and
tweets showed Maremont’s name and image, meaning that any
followers would have the erroneous impression that Maremont
was the author. Maremont asked SFDG to stop using her
account. Because SFDG did not stop using her account,
Maremont changed the passwords to her personal Facebook
and Twitter accounts.75
Maremont was very close to bringing her Lanham claim to
a jury, considering the court found that “the Twitter account
was in Maremont’s name, not SFDG’s, and it would be
reasonable to conclude that posts made on that account were
made by Maremont herself.”76 But because Maremont did not
claim any actual economic damages, a requirement for Lanham
claims, her former employer won their summary judgment

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Maremont, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 969.
Id.
Id.
Maremont, 2014 WL 812401, at *5.
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motion on this issue.77 However, her claim for a violation of the
Stored Communications Act was allowed to continue,
considering there was an issue that could not be determined by
summary judgment: “Defendants admit that they accessed
Maremont’s Facebook account and posted Tweets to
Maremont’s Twitter account. The parties dispute whether
Defendants’ actions were authorized or exceeded the scope of
Maremont’s authorization.”78
From the viewpoint of the employer, the use of the
personal accounts was to only keep the social media presence of
the company active during Maremont’s injury. But from the
perspective of the employee, prying into her personal accounts
– even if she gave the passwords to others was a step too far in
intruding into her personal life.
B. Sponsorship Deals: Mendendall v. Hanesbrands, Inc.
Another way to look at the issue of what types of
limitations employers should have over the social media
interactions of employees relates to the moral rights clauses
included in brand sponsorship agreements. To enter into these
agreements, entertainers, including professional athletes, have
the opportunity to consult with attorneys and other
representatives putting their interests first. The money gained
through these deals is not their sole source of income – thereby
allowing for the type of contracting most employees do not
receive. In contrast to “at-will” employment or contracts of
adhesion, these contracts when containing morals clauses,
including limitations on the use of social media, are entered
into with full knowledge of the consequences. Additionally,
public figures can be sought out by brands specifically for their
personas which is not generally the reason why average
employees are hired.
Therefore, looking at a case where a brand sponsor took
action against an athlete’s “bad actions” on social media helps
to demonstrate how those with more contracting ability than
the vast majority of employees can speak openly – even if they
77. Id. at 4-5.
78. Id. at 6.
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have a branding agreement that says otherwise. On July 18,
2011, NFL’s Pittsburgh Steelers player, Rashard Mendenhall,
sued Hanesbrands, Inc. claiming that Hanesbrands breached
their talent agreement by terminating his exclusive
endorsement contract based on several controversial tweets
from his twitter account, @R_Mendendall.79 Mendenhall used
Twitter “to be himself, to express his opinions and [to] foster
debate on controversial and non-controversial issues.”80
Hanesbrands had not taken any steps against previous
potential polarizing tweets, but did act to terminate the
contract a week after Mendenhall issued a series of tweets in
May 2011 concerning the public celebrations of Osama bin
Laden’s death.81 His tweets included:
What kind of person celebrates death? It’s
amazing how people can HATE a man they never
even heard speak. We’ve only heard one side . . .
....
For those of you who said we want to see Bin
Laden burn in hell and piss on his ashes, I ask
how would God feel about your heart?
There is not an ignorant bone in my body. I just
encourage you to #think
@dkller23 We’ll never know what really
happened. I just have a hard time believing a
plane could take a skyscraper down demolition
style.82
The termination was based on the morals clause of
Mendenhall’s contract:
If Mendenhall commits or is arrested for any
crime or becomes involved in any situation or
occurrence . . . tending to bring Mendenhall into

79.
2012).
80.
81.
82.

Mendenhall v. Hanesbrands Inc., 856 F. Supp. 2d 717 (M.D.N.C.
Id. at 720.
Id.
Id.
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public disrepute, contempt, scandal or ridicule, or
tending to shock, insult or offend the majority of
the consuming public or any protected class or
group thereof, then we shall have the right to
immediately
terminate
this
Agreement.
[Hanesbrands’] decision on all matters arising
under this Section . . . shall be conclusive.83
In a public statement, Hanesbrands elaborated on its
position regarding their view of the breach of the morals
clause:
Champion is a strong supporter of the
government’s efforts to fight terrorism and is
very appreciative of the dedication and
commitment of the U.S. Armed Forces. Earlier
this week, Rashard Mendenhall, who endorses
Champion
products,
expressed
personal
comments and opinions regarding Osama bin
Laden and the September 11 terrorist attacks
that were inconsistent with the values of the
Champion brand and with which we strongly
disagreed. . . . Champion was obligated to
conduct a business assessment to determine
whether Mr. Mendenhall could continue to
effectively communicate on behalf of and
represent Champion with consumers.
While we respect Mr. Mendenhall’s right to
express sincere thoughts regarding potentially
controversial topics, we no longer believe that
Mr. Mendenhall can appropriately represent
Champion and we have notified Mr. Mendenhall
that we are ending our business relationship.84
Mendenhall also released a blog post following his tweets
where he said:

83. Id. at 725.
84. Id. at 721-22.
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This controversial statement was something I
said in response to the amount of joy I saw in the
event of a murder. I don’t believe that this is an
issue of politics or American pride; but one of
religion, morality, and human ethics. . . . I
apologize for the timing as such a sensitive
matter, but it was not meant to do harm. I
apologize to anyone I unintentionally harmed
with anything that I said, or any hurtful
interpretation that was made and put in my
name.
It was only meant to encourage anyone reading it
to think.85
Hanesbrand viewed these tweets as causing a public
scandal – and thereby Mendenhall was in breach of the
contract. However, applying New York law to the Hanesbrands’
motion for judgment as a matter of law, Chief District Judge
James A. Beaty concluded that issues of fact remained
regarding the public’s response to the tweets and the reasoning
of the contract termination.86 Because the evidence presented
was contradictory (supportive tweets presented by Mendenhall
and negative news reports submitted by Hanesbrands), the
case could not be resolved on a motion for judgment on the
pleadings.87
Additionally, Steelers President Art Rooney II released a
statement regarding Mendenhall’s tweets:
I have not spoken with Rashard, so it is hard to
explain or even comprehend what he meant with
his recent Twitter comments. The entire Steelers
organization is very proud of the job our military
personnel have done and we can only hope this
leads to our troops coming home soon.88

85. Id. at 721.
86. Id. at 727.
87. Id. at 728.
88. Rashard Mendenhall Doesn’t Hold Back, ESPN (May 4, 2011, 9:57
AM), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=6471433.
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However, Mendenhall received no punishment from the
Steelers organization or the NFL based on his tweets. The case
was reported settled at mediation in December 2012.89
V. Student Athletes
Professional athletes may have limitations on their social
media use placed on them by either the brands they contract
with for sponsorship or by their teams, but these limitations
are contracted. On the other hand, there have been a number
of discussions about how student athletes have much more
limited personal autonomy than either the general student
population or professional athletes. Another limitation placed
on student athletes that distances them from their peers are
partial or complete bans on student athlete use of social media.
Some law review articles have argued that these restrictions go
too far,90 though not all follow that viewpoint.91 Based on the
NLRB ruling (discussed infra) regarding student athletes, it is
possible that students will be doubly protected both by this
ruling and by state-specific social media password laws, if they
are indeed considered both students and employees.
Student athletes, like most college students in their lateteens and early twenties, are in the process of figuring out who
they are – and part of the learning process for many is
communicating and socializing using social media. As danah
89. See Mendenhall v. Hanesbrands Inc., 856 F. Supp. 2d 717 (M.D.N.C.
2012) (more specifically, the docket, No. 1:11CV00570, which presents the
case settled in December of 2012).
90. See J. Wes Gay, Hands Off Twitter: Are NCAA Student-Athlete Social
Media Bans Unconstitutional?, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 781, 804 (2012) (“Under
either the Tinker substantial disruption test or a narrowly tailored test, these
team-wide and season-long social media bans are likely violations of the
student-athletes' First Amendment speech rights.”); Marcus Hauer, The
Constitutionality of Public University Bans of Student-Athlete Speech
Through Social Media, 37 VT. L. REV. 413 (2012); Frank D. LoMonte, Fouling
the First Amendment: Why Colleges Can't, and Shouldn't, Control Student
Athletes' Speech on Social Media, 9 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 1 (2014); Kayleigh R.
Mayer, Colleges and Universities All Atwitter: Constitutional Implications of
Regulating and Monitoring Student-Athletes' Twitter Usage, 23 MARQ.
SPORTS L. REV. 455, 468 (2013).
91. Elizabeth Etherton, Seen but Not Heard: Constitutional Questions
Surrounding Social Media Policies Affecting Student-Athletes, 11
WILLAMETTE SPORTS L.J. 41 (2014).
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boyd discusses in the book, It’s Complicated: The Social Lives of
Networked Teens, teens and young adults learn through
interacting with others on social media and through creating
their identities.92 An absolutist rule that restricts the use of
social media prevents student athletes from learning how to
use social media responsibly.
Moreover, many of the
restrictions for student athletes are based around banning the
usage of specific inflammatory words.93 The focus on specific
words leaves out the overall responsible use of social media, or
more specifically about behavior, interaction with others, or
appropriate topics of conversation. Finally, the limitations are
established under the working assumption that an individual
student athlete is communicating on behalf of the university, or
as a representative of a university, not as a private citizen.94
The focus of many of these regulations is on the impact on
the school’s brand rather than on the education of students.
Some critics, such as Zak Brown, detail the focus on the brand,
but also the difficulties in balancing speech rights and
potential damage to the brand:
Allowing a student-athlete to voice somewhat
controversial political or academic views on
92. See generally DANAH BOYD, IT’S COMPLICATED: THE SOCIAL LIVES OF
NETWORKED TEENS (2014).
93. Jack Dickey, Don't Say "Colt 45" or "Pearl Necklace": How To Avoid
Being Busted By The Facebook Cops of College Sports, DEADSPIN (May 24,
2012), http://deadspin.com/5912230/dont-say-colt-45-or-pearl-necklace-howto-avoid-being-busted-by-the-facebook-cops-of-college-sports; Jack Dickey,
"Ass Ranger" To "Zoomies": The Complete List Of Things College Athletes
Can't
Say
on
Social
Media,
DEADSPIN
(May
24,
2012),
http://deadspin.com/5912832/ass-ranger-to-zoomies-heres-the-complete-listof-what-college-athletes-shouldnt-say-on-twitter; Pete Thamel, Tracking
Twitter, Raising Red Flags, N.Y. TIMES, March 31, 2012. at D1 (A social
media tracking company for college teams uses “a computer application that
searches social media sites that athletes frequent, looking for obscenities,
offensive commentary or words like “free,” which could indicate that a player
has accepted a gift in violation of N.C.A.A. rules. … A company executive
says these programs ‘look for things that could damage the school’s brand’”).
94. Kayleigh R. Mayer, Colleges and Universities All Atwitter:
Constitutional Implications of Regulating and Monitoring Student-Athletes'
Twitter Usage, 23 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 455, 468 (2013) (“Student-athletes
are still students; therefore, if only the student-athletes are subject to
regulations and penalties for using Twitter and the rest of the student body is
not, then the schools may not be treating those similarly situated alike.”).
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Twitter or Facebook would be preferable to a
First Amendment suit that could result in far
worse press and litigation costs. If the studentathlete’s statement is truly egregious and
damaging to the program, it is likely that it
would either reasonably be perceived to bear the
imprimatur of the school or cause substantial
disruption on campus. . . . But punishing speech
because of a “mere desire to avoid the discomfort
and unpleasantness that always accompany an
unpopular viewpoint” would be a questionable
decision.95
Eric D. Bentley, the Senior Assistant General Counsel for
the University of Houston System, has written a law review
article that gives practical advice regarding social media
policies for athletes from an institutional perspective including
the following best practices:
Best Practice Tip #1: Do Not Ban Athletes’ Use of
Social Media
....
Best Practice Tip #2: Place Reasonable
Restrictions on the Use of Social Media and then
Educate the Athletes on the Dangers [and]
....
Best Practice Tip #3: Evaluate the Content of
Social Media Postings on a Case by Case Basis
and with Extreme Caution.96
Most of the limitations suggested by Bentley fall within
the types of restrictions that would be used for any student or
employee acting as a public representative of an institution 95. Zak Brown, Note, What's Said in This Locker Room, Stays in This
Locker Room: Restricting the Social Media Use of Collegiate Athletes and the
Implications for Their Institutions, 10 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 421, 442
(2012).
96. Eric D. Bentley, He Tweeted What? A First Amendment Analysis of
the Use of Social Media by College Athletes and Recommended Best Practices
for Athletic Departments, 38 J.C. & U.L. 451, 458-62 (2012).
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not just on social media. He suggests that an athlete can be
disciplined based on the content of the posting, only within
very specific categories, including for fighting words/true
threats; defamatory statements; and postings that indicate
For potentially unprotected
violations of criminal law.97
speech, an athlete can be disciplined based on the content of
the posting after a detailed review of multiple factors, for
engaging in harassing speech, or materially disruptive
Bentley’s only two categories that would not
speech.98
generally be covered by other types of student or employee
limitations are obscenity and violations of “reasonable” team
rules or NCAA rules.99
The issue of what exactly student athletes are legally –
just students, players who happen to be students, employees,
or some combination – has moved to the forefront recently. On
March 26, 2014, Regional Director of the NLRB, Peter Sung
Ohr, issued Decision 13-RC-121359, finding that Northwestern
football players receiving grant-in-aid scholarships are
employees under the NLRA.100 The decision by the Regional
Director is not one based on whether student athletes are
employees within a larger picture regarding ethical issues,
such as potential exploitation of students, or whether it is best
for players to be considered employees over students. The posthearing Brief of the College Athletes Players Association in the
case demonstrates how student athletes’ interactions with the
public, including social media, are limited by Northwestern:
Players are required to make media appearances
as directed by the University. The Players are
also subject to a social media policy, separate
from the policy applicable to students, which is
enforced by the Athletic Department. . . .
Violations of this policy can result in dismissal
from the football program and loss of the Player’s
97. Id. at 463-67.
98. Id. at 469-73.
99. Id. at 466-69.
100. Nw. Univ. v. Employer & Coll. Athletes Players Ass'n, 2014
N.L.R.B.
Lexis
221
(Mar.
26,
2014),
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d4581667b6f.
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athletic scholarship. . . . Players must give access
to their Facebook and Twitter accounts to
coaches who monitor what the Players say or
post online. . . . The Players are prohibited from
using certain swear words . . . and can be
suspended if they “embarrass [the] team” [sic] . .
. . The University also prohibits a Player from
providing any media interview unless arranged
by the Athletic Department communications
staff.101
Instead of making a decision based on political grounds or
the larger social implications, the decision follows the usual
NLRB checklist regarding whether players statutorily behave
as employees. In the Northwestern case, the players are
considered employees because they perform monetarily
valuable services for a revenue-generating university sports
program. The student athletes are recruited for and granted
scholarships because of their skills in football rather than
academics, and receive scholarships as compensation for their
athletic services. They are required to sign agreements that
serve as an employment contract with detailed information
regarding length-of and conditions-for receiving compensation
and are dependent on their scholarships to pay for basic
necessities (considering they are limited regarding outside
employment). These student athletes’ scholarships are tied to
their actions as football players; their scholarships may be
immediately canceled if team rules are violated.102 Much of the
Northwestern decision concerned the complete picture of the
controlled lives of athletes, whom “nearly every aspect of the
players’ private lives” is controlled including where they live,
any employment, off-campus travel, and interaction with the
larger world, including social media posts and dealings with
media.103 At the time of publication, this decision is being

101. Post-Hearing Brief of the Petitioner, Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n,
Nw. Univ. v, Employer & Coll. Athletes Players Ass'n, 13-RC-121359, 2014
WL 1922054 (Mar. 17, 2014) (citations omitted).
102. Nw. Univ., 2014 N.L.R.B. Lexis 221.
103. Id. at 16.
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appealed.104
The NLRB decision included discussions about social
media activity, reworking the language from the post-hearing
brief almost exactly:
The players must also abide by a social media
policy, which restricts what they can post on the
internet, including Twitter, Facebook, and
Instagram. In fact, the players are prohibited
from denying a coach’s “friend” request and the
former’s postings are monitored. The Employer
prohibits players from giving media interviews
unless they are directed to participate in
interviews that are arranged by the Athletic
Department. Players are prohibited from
104. Nw. Univ. v. Employer & Coll. Athletics Players Ass'n, 2014 WL
1653118, at *1 (Apr. 24, 2014) (review granted); Nw. Univ. v. Employer &
Coll. Athletes Players Ass'n, 13-RC-121359, 2014 WL 1881179, at *1 (May
12, 2014) (Notice and invitation to file briefs, asks Briefs to answer the
following questions: “1. What test should the Board apply to determine
whether grant-in-aid scholarship football players are “employees” within the
meaning of Section 2(3) of the Act, and what is the proper result here,
applying the appropriate test? 2. Insofar as the Board's decision in Brown
University, 342 NLRB 483 (2004), may be applicable to this case, should the
Board adhere to, modify, or overrule the test of employee status applied in
that case, and if so, on what basis? 3. What policy considerations are relevant
to the Board's determination of whether grant-in-aid scholarship football
players are ‘employees’ within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the Act and
what result do they suggest here? 4. To what extent, if any, is the existence or
absence of determinations regarding employee status of grant-in-aid
scholarship football players under other federal or state statutes or
regulations relevant to whether such players are ‘employees’ under the Act?
5. To what extent are the employment discrimination provisions of Title VII,
in comparison to the antidiscrimination provisions of Title IX of the
Education Amendments Act of 1972, relevant to whether grant-in-aid
scholarship football players are ‘employees’ under the Act? 6. If grant-in-aid
scholarship football players are ‘employees’ under the Act, to what extent, if
any, should the Board consider, in determining the parties' collectivebargaining obligations, the existence of outside constraints that may alter the
ability of the parties to engage in collective bargaining as to certain terms
and conditions of employment? What, if any, should be the impact of such
constraints on the parties' bargaining obligations? In the alternative, should
the Board recognize grant-in-aid scholarship football players as ‘employees’
under the Act, but preclude them from being represented in any bargaining
unit or engaging in any collective bargaining, as is the case with confidential
employees under Board law?”).
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swearing in public, and if a player “embarrasses”
the team, he can be suspended for one game. A
second offense of this nature can result in a
suspension of up to one year.105
It is unclear whether this ruling will stand. However, even
if the national NLRB overturns this decision, the fact that
student athletes generally face more regulations of social
media than other students and non-student athlete employees
has now officially been noted. Some commentators have begun
to theorize solutions benefiting student athletes, assuming that
the ruling stands.106
VI. The Next Battleground
After student-athletes, the professoriate is the next
category of employees whose jobs are affected by a blurred line
between the personal and professional use of social media. The
Kansas Board of Regents recently revised its university
personnel policies making improper use of social media
grounds for discipline up to and including termination for both
faculty and staff. 107 Social media is defined as “any online tool
or service through which virtual communities are created
allowing users to publish commentary and other content,
including but not limited to blogs, wikis, and social networking
sites such as Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, Flickr, and
YouTube” – those that still use email and listservs will be glad
to hear the policy does not apply to them.108
The policy does have a First Amendment saving clause,
“recogniz[ing] the First Amendment rights as well as the
responsibilities of all employees, including faculty and staff, to

105. Nw. Univ. v. Employer & Coll. Athletes Players Ass'n, 13-RC121359, 198 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1837 (N.L.R.B.), 2014 WL 1246914, 2014
N.L.R.B. Lexis 221 (Mar. 26, 2014).
106. See M. Tyler Brown, College Athletics Internships: The Case for
Academic Credit in College Athletics, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 1855 (2014).
107. Use of Social Media by Faculty and Staff, KAN. BD. OF REGENTS
(policy
effective
December
18,
2013),
available
at
http://www.kansasregents.org/policy_chapter_ii_f_use_of_social_media.
108. Id. § 6(b)(1).
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speak on matters of public concern as private citizens, if they
choose to do so, including through social media.”109 However,
what defines a “private citizen” is not articulated, but rather is
based on institutional identity and branding:
The Board supports the responsible use of
existing
and
emerging
communications
technologies, including social media, to serve the
teaching, research, and public service missions of
the state universities. These communications
technologies are powerful tools for advancing
state university missions, but at the same time
pose risks of substantial harm to personal
reputations and to the efficient operation of the
higher education system.110
The policy also does not reference how people often include
their job title as part of their identity as a common practice
within professional circles, including academia, or include
references to their alma mater or school of employment
through fan participation:
When determining whether a particular use of
social media constitutes an improper use, the
following shall be considered: academic freedom
principles, the employee’s position within the
university, whether the employee used or
publicized the university name, brands, website,
official title or school/department/college or
otherwise created the appearance of the
communication being endorsed, approved or
connected to the university in a manner that
discredits
the
university,
whether
the
communication was made during the employee’s
working hours and whether the communication
was transmitted utilizing university systems or

109. Id. § 6(a).
110. Id. § 6(b).
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equipment.111
If one was an employee of a university in Kansas, looking
at the disciplinary standard above, would one be able to refer to
one’s job title within a personal blog, or display their
participation as a fan at sporting events, such as wearing team
Based on this definition, any personal
merchandise?112
identifier shared online, even casually (i.e. career/place of
employment, favorite sports team, participation in a
performance or talk) could be grounds for employment
termination. Considering that the default of social media
cultural norms is the open sharing of personal information to
define an individual’s online identity, the law and online
culture continue to be at odds.
VII. Conclusion
In this article, we have explored the question of who gets
to determine when an individual’s online speech represents - or
hurts - a company or brand. For professional athletes and
employees with true negotiated contracts, restricting or
monitoring an individual’s “free time” speech could
theoretically be an acceptable response (ex. a “moral contracts”
provision.). After all, when both parties have true economic
power to either enter into the contract – or not, with lawyers
representing both sides, interference by courts or policymakers
seems unnecessary.
However, when most employees either have contracts of
adhesion or instead are at-will employees, employers should
not have social media policies that unfairly restrict their
employees’ social media usage when not on the job. Creating a
simplified national regulatory regime where the default is
privacy for social media accounts would help protect the
111. Id. § 6(b)(4).
112. Richard E. Levy, The Tweet Hereafter: Social Media and the Free
Speech Rights of Kansas Public University Employees, 24 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 78, 106 (2014) (“[T]he original Social Media Policy would appear to
authorize the University to revoke my tenure and dismiss me for the
publication of this article using social media if it determined that my analysis
or conclusions are contrary to its interests.”).
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interests of employees. Also, this default would better allow
the public to see statements from individuals as reflecting only
their own views rather than automatically as statements
reflecting viewpoints of an employer. Moving to the point
where the public views social media from an individual in their
“private” space as reflecting upon them, rather than also on
their employer will take time – and adjustment.
Using the example of student athletes, many had social
media accounts before their athletic vocations became of
interest to the potential financial interest of educational
institutions that might also be their employer. And like any
other student – or employee, they may indeed interact on social
media in a way that others wish they had not. There are much
more important issues and structural problems regarding
student-athletes, including how students are impacted by
concerns over with maintaining team image and profitability
(e.g. the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill eligibility
academic fraud scandal113) not to mention potential crime
cover-ups. Focusing on social media use prioritizes “lowhanging fruit” over systemic problems in academic policy.
On the other hand, executives, human resource
professionals, and others who have direct control over hiring
and firing, based on their relationship to other employees, have
a demonstrated obligation to not engage in discriminatory
practices. The conundrum is that evaluating an individual’s
work based on what they say on social media is only reflecting
a small segment of an individual’s daily life or opinions.
Someone could be acting in a legally indefensible manner in
regards to hiring, regardless of their social media presence;
focusing on social media is the wrong nexus – or at the very
least, the easy nexus. For now, the approach that federal
financial regulators take regarding social media, whether a
statement could be seen as directed by or standing in for the
viewpoint of the employer, is the closest to a well-balanced
legal test as presently available.
However, social media technology and online cultural
norms now make the lives and the speech of employees public
113. Jack Stripling, Widespread Nature of Chapel Hill's Academic Fraud
Is
Laid
Bare,
CHRON.
OF
HIGH.
EDUC.
(Oct.
23,
2014),
https://chronicle.com/article/Widespread-Nature-of-Chapel/149603/.
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in ways that were previously obscured. Additionally, social
media technology and online cultural norms blur the line
between who is considered an audience versus a friend, or an
individual versus a brand. With this in mind, there should be
limitations to the ability for an employer to control or monitor
the social media activity and speech of an employee that has no
direct impact on the public perception of the company.
In the end, the question remains – how intrusive do we
want employers to be in the lives of their employees? Most
employers have a list of characteristics that they do not make
employment decisions about, some required by law. During the
time of employment, an employer may seek to restrict
employee speech that may negatively impact a company’s
bottom line, such as union organizing.
While many individuals participate in social media
platforms intending to connect with peers or families, there is
an unacknowledged public-facing role assumed as well, due to
the functionality of these services. Current law and policy
about social media and employees approach social media
websites primarily as a platform for marketing or professional
discussion, but do not fully address the issue of social
networking, that is – the activity and behavior that drives the
activity of social media websites. Future focus should more
closely observe the ever-changing and reciprocal impact of
online behavioral activity, technology functionality, and
business use that drive how social media websites are used,
and impact how people work, live, and play online, often at the
same time.
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Appendix: State Laws Regarding Employer and Educational
Institution Regulation of Employees and Higher Education
Students
(as of May 2014)
State

Bill #

Status

Arkansas

H.B.
1901114

April 22, 2013;
Signed
by
Governor, Act
1480

Arkansas

H.B.
1902115

April 8, 2013.
Signed
by
Governor, Act
998.

Type of Limitation
Prohibits an employer
from requiring or
requesting a current
or
prospective
employee
from
disclosing his or her
username
or
password for a social
media account.
Prohibits
an
institution of higher
education
from
requiring
or
requesting a current
or
prospective
employee or student
from disclosing his or
her username or
password for a social
media account.

114. H.B. 1901, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013).
115. H.B. 1902, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/14
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California

PACE LAW REVIEW

A.B.
1844116

Vol. 35:1

Prohibits an employer
from requiring or
requesting
an
employee
or
applicant
for
employment
to
disclose a user name
or password for the
purpose of accessing
personal social media
to access personal
social media in the
September 27, presence
of
the
2012. Signed employer,
or
to
by Governor, divulge any personal
Chapter 618.
social
media.
Prohibits an employer
from
discharging,
disciplining,
threatening
to
discharge
or
discipline,
or
otherwise retaliating
against an employee
or applicant for not
complying with a
request or demand by
a violating employer.

116. Assemb. B. 1844, 2012 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012).
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California

S.B. 1349117

September 27,
2012. Signed
by Governor,
Chapter 619.

Colorado

H.B.
1046118

May 11, 2013.
Signed
by
Governor,
Chapter 195.

443

Prohibits public and
private postsecondary
educational
institutions,
employees
and
representatives from
requiring
or
requesting a student,
prospective student,
or student group to
disclose
personal
social
media
information. Prohibits
such institutions from
threatening or taking
certain actions for
refusal of a demand
for such information.
Requires
certain
actions
by
such
institutions to ensure
compliance
with
these
provisions.
Requires
such
institution to post
social media privacy
policy on its web site.
Concerns employer
access to personal
information through
electronic
communication
devices.

117. S.B. 1349, 2012 S. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012).
118. H.B. 1046, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2013).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/14
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Delaware

Illinois

PACE LAW REVIEW

H.B. 309119

July20,
2012.Signed by
Governor,
Chapter 354.

H.B.
3782120

August
1,
2012. Signed
by Governor.
Public Act 970875.

Vol. 35:1
Makes it unlawful for
a public or nonpublic
academic institution
to mandate that a
student or applicant
disclose password or
account information
granting the academic
institution access to
students’
or
applicants’
social
networking profile or
account.
Prohibits
academic institutions
from requesting that a
student or applicant
log onto a personal
social media account.
Amends the Right to
Privacy
in
the
Workplace
Act.
Provides that it shall
be unlawful for any
employer to ask any
prospective employee
to
provide
any
username, password,
or
other
related
account information
in order to gain
access to a social
networking website
where
that
prospective employee
maintains an account
or profile.

119. H.B. 309, 146th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2012).
120. H.B. 3782, 97th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2012).
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H.B. 64121
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Creates the Right to
Privacy in the School
Setting Act. Defines
“school”
as
an
institution of higher
learning as defined in
the Higher Education
Student
Assistance
Act,
a
public
elementary
or
secondary school or
school district, or a
nonpublic
school
recognized by the
State
Board
of
Education. Provides
Aug. 2, 2013. that it is unlawful for
Signed
by a school to request or
Governor,
require a student or
Public Act No. prospective student or
129.
his or her parent or
guardian to provide a
password or other
related
account
information in order
to gain access to the
student’s
or
prospective student’s
account or profile on
a social networking
website or to demand
access in any manner
to a student’s or
prospective student’s
account or profile on
a social networking
website.

121. H.B. 64, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/14
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Illinois

PACE LAW REVIEW

S.B. 2306122

Vol. 35:1

Amends the Right to
Privacy
in
the
Workplace
Act;
provides that the
restriction on an
employer’s
request
for
information
concerning
an
Aug. 16, 2013. employee’s
social
Signed
by networking profile or
Governor,
website applies to
Public Act No. only the employee’s
501.
personal
account;
defines
terms;
provides
that
employers are not
prohibited
from
complying with the
rules
of
selfregulatory
organizations.

122. S.B. 2306, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013).
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Louisiana

H.B. 340123

May 22, 2014.
Signed
by
Governor, Act
No. 16.

Maine

H.B. 838124

May 1, 2013.
Enacted,
Chapter 112.

447

Creates the Personal
Online
Account
Privacy
Protection
Act;
prohibits
employers
and
educational
institutions
from
requesting
or
requiring individuals
to
disclose
information
that
allows access to or
observation
of
personal
online
accounts;
prohibits
employers
and
educational
institutions
from
taking certain actions
for failure to disclose
information
that
allows access to
personal
online
accounts;
limits
liability for failure to
search or monitor the
activity of personal
online accounts.
Directs a study of
social media privacy
in schools and the
workplace.

123. H.B. 340, 2014 Reg. Leg. Sess. (La. 2014).
124. H.B. 838, 126th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2013).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/14
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PACE LAW REVIEW

Maryland

H.B. 964125
S.B. 433126

May 2, 2012.
Signed
by
Governor,
Chapter
232/233.

Michigan

H.B.
5523127

Dec. 27, 2012.
Signed
by
Governor,
Public Act 478.

A.B. 181128

June 13, 2013.
Signed
by
Governor.
Chapter 548.

Nevada

125.
126.
127.
128.

Vol. 35:1
Prohibits an employer
from requesting or
requiring that an
employee
or
applicant disclose any
user name, password,
or other means for
accessing a personal
account or service
through
specified
electronic
communications
devices.
Prohibits employers
and
educational
institutions
from
requiring
certain
individuals
to
disclose information
that allows access to
certain
social
networking accounts.
Prohibits employers
and
educational
institutions
from
taking certain actions
for failure to disclose
information
that
allows access to
certain
social
networking accounts.
Makes
various
changes to provisions
governing
employment
practices.

H.B. 964, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2012).
S.B. 433, 2012 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2012).
H.B. 5523, 96th Leg., 2012 Sess. (Mich. 2012).
A.B. 181, 77th Reg. Ses. (N.V. 2013).
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A.B.
2879129

December
3,
2012. Signed
by Governor,
Chapter 75.

A.B.
2878130

Aug. 28, 2013.
Signed
by
Governor,
Chapter
No.
2013-155

S.B. 371131

April 5, 2013.
Signed
by
Governor,
Chapter 222.
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Prohibits requirement
to disclose user name,
password, or other
means for accessing
account or service
through
electronic
communications
devices
by
institutions of higher
education.
Prohibits requirement
to disclose user name,
password, or other
means for accessing
account or service
through
electronic
communications
device by employers.
Relates
to
employment;
prohibits prospective
employers
from
requesting
or
requiring
a
prospective employee
to provide a password
or access to the
prospective
employee’s
social
networking account.

129. A.B. 2879, 215th Leg. (N.J. 2012).
130. A.B. 2878, 215th Leg. (N.J. 2012).
131. S.B. 371, 2013 Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2013).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/14
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New Mexico

S.B. 422132

April 5, 2013.
Signed
by
Governor,
Chapter 223.

Oklahoma

H.B.
2372133

May 21, 2014.
Signed
by
Governor,
Chap. 315.

Vol. 35:1
Relates to education;
prohibits public and
private institutions of
post-secondary
education
from
requesting
or
requiring a student,
applicant or potential
applicant
for
admission to provide
a password or access
to
the
social
networking account
of the student or
applicant
for
admission.
Relates to labor;
prohibits
employer
from requesting or
requiring access to
social media account
of certain employees;
prohibits an employer
from
taking
retaliatory personnel
action for failure to
provide access to
social media account;
authorizes
civil
actions for violations;
provides for recovery
of attorney fees and
court costs; defines
terms; provides for
codification; provides
an effective date.

132. S.B. 422, 2013 Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2013).
133. H.B. 2372, 54th Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2014).
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H.B.
2654134

May 22, 2013;
Signed
by
Governor.
Chapter 204.

S.B. 344135

June 13, 2013;
Signed
by
Governor.
Chapter 408.
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Prohibits an employer
from
compelling
employee
or
applicant
for
employment
to
provide access to
personal social media
account or to add
employer to social
media contact list;
prohibits retaliation
by employer against
employee
or
applicant for refusal
to provide access to
accounts or to add
employer to contact
list; prohibits certain
educational
institutions
from
compelling student or
prospective student to
provide access to
personal social media
account.
Provides that a public
or private educational
institution may not
require, request or
otherwise compel a
student or prospective
student to disclose or
to provide access to a
personal social media
account.

134. H.B. 2654, 2013 Reg. Sess. (Or. 2013).
135. S.B. 344, 2013 Reg. Sess. (Or. 2013).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/14
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Tennessee

Utah

PACE LAW REVIEW

S.B. 1808136

May 16, 2014.
Signed
by
Governor,
Chapter 826.

H.B. 100137

March
26,
2013. Signed
by Governor,
Chapter 94.

Vol. 35:1
Creates the Employee
Online Privacy Act of
2014 which prevents
an employer from
requiring
an
employee to disclose
the username and
password for the
employee’s personal
internet
account
except under certain
circumstances.
Modifies provisions
addressing labor in
general and higher
education to enact
protections
for
personal
Internet
accounts; enacts the
Internet Employment
Privacy
Act,
including
defining
terms, permitting or
prohibiting
certain
actions
by
an
employer; provides
that the chapter does
not create certain
duties;
provides
private
right
of
action; enacts the
Internet
Postsecondary
Education
Privacy
Act.

136. S.B. 1808, 108th Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 2014).
137. H.B. 100, 2013 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2013).

55

2014

HERE WE ARE NOW, ENTERTAIN US

Vermont

S.B. 7138

Washington

S.B. 5211139

453

June 3, 2013.
Relates to social
Signed
by
networking privacy
Governor, Act
protection.
47
Relates
to
employment practice;
requires an employer
cannot require any
employee
or
prospective employee
May 21, 2013.
to
submit
any
Signed
by
password or other
Governor,
related
account
Chapter 330.
information in order
to gain access to the
individual’s personal
social
networking
website account or
profile.

138. S.B. 7, 2013-14 Gen. Assemb., Leg. Sess. (Vt. 2013).
139. S.B. 5211, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2013).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/14
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Wisconsin

PACE LAW REVIEW

S.B. 223140

Vol. 35:1

Relates to employer
access
to,
and
observation of, the
personal
Internet
accounts
of
employees
and
applicants
for
employment; relates
to
educational
Jan. 22, 2014. institution access to,
Signed
by and observation of,
Governor, Act the personal Internet
208.
accounts of students
and
prospective
students; relates to
landlord access to,
and observation of,
the personal Internet
accounts of tenants
and
prospective
tenants; provides a
penalty.

140. S.B. 223, 2013-14 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wis. 2014).
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